MANDATORY LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR GUN OWNERS
The debate over the right to possess a firearm has been waged at varying levels of intensity for years. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court “discovered” in the 2nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution an individual’s right to own a gun — choosing to ignore words like “a well-regulated militia” in defiance of basic rules of constitutional/statutory interpretation.
If the Court were really interested in the Founding Founders’ original intent, they would have ruled that U.S. citizens could have muskets and flint-lock pistols. The legal door being closed requires other approaches to various aspects of gun control — specifically, the consequence of violence in our society.
Mandatory liability insurance for every firearm would shift the discussion from the right to own a gun to accountability for the harm ensuing from that ownership. Insurance would allocate to gun owners the economic harm resulting from the use of personal property they elected to own. While no guarantee against the harm itself, the financial risks well may trigger heightened caution with respect to the trading in and use of guns. A reduced potential for random acts of gun violence may be the additional benefit.
Car insurance is the apposite analogy. According to the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, automobile insurance is mandatory in 47 states. The right of states to have such a requirement is not challenged. A similar requirement for gun insurance, preferably at the federal level for purposes of uniformity in law and enforcement, is no less legitimate.
Although specific figures are hard to come by, the consensus is that the medical costs resulting from gun injuries exceed $100 billion annually. Even a portion of such a staggering figure justifies a change in the status quo. The human cost is, of course, incalculable.
Gun buyers could be required to obtain, say, $1 million of coverage for harm suffered by persons not engaged in the commission of a crime who are injured as the result of a discharge — accidental or intentional —- of the owner’s firearm.
Victims of gun violence would have the right to sue gun owners for their negligence (if the owner pulled the trigger) or negligent entrustment (if the owner lent the gun to the shooter or the gun was stolen). In all instances except legitimate self-defense, and consistent with long-standing doctrine, strict liability should be the legal standard given that firearms are inherently dangerous.
Legislation will have to address the fact that a very large share of gun violence is committed with firearms that are stolen or otherwise illegally obtained. The requirement that owners take measures necessary to prevent the theft or unlawful use of their guns is imperative, but will not fully solve the problem of violence committed with stolen weapons. The scope of liability might be lessened if a gun owner reported the theft of his firearm.
As state motor vehicle bureaus have done for decades with cars, the Bureau for Tobacco, Alcohol and Firearms could create and maintain a database with the names and addresses of the insureds and their insurers, an inventory of guns (by serial number and type) listed by owner, and the insurance policy expiration dates.
Insurers would have to notify the authorities about expired policies that were not renewed. Access to this information would be limited to law enforcement officials, gun sellers, and individuals harmed by guns.
As with car insurance, a certificate of insurance would verify a gun owner’s compliance with the law. Failure to obtain and maintain coverage would lead, in the first instance, to a fine. A substantially larger fine and suspension of the right to own guns would punish a second offense. Any subsequent failure to comply would result in the loss of the right to own a gun and, possibly, jail time.
Similarly, a buyer would be required to confirm to the gun seller that insurance was being procured. As with a car purchase, the gun seller and insurer would work together to generate the requisite proof. Sellers supplying guns to buyers without insurance would be subject to a suspension (e.g., six months) of their license to sell guns. An additional sanction might be jail time for the seller’s employee (and if appropriate, the employee’s superior) who allowed an uninsured buyer to purchase a gun.
This regulatory regime has several benefits. First, the insurance premiums paid would generate a pool of funds to compensate the injured, including police officers, crime victims, and children hurt playing with guns. These funds could help alleviate the devastating financial consequences to victims who lack health, disability, or life insurance and face astronomical hospital, rehabilitation, and long-term care costs. They also would address the problem of gun owners who, if held liable, do not have sufficient assets to compensate the victim.
Second, such a system would result in a fairer allocation of the economic burden of gun injuries, which today is overwhelmingly imposed on taxpayers. Liability insurance would shift the burden, now borne disproportionately by the public, to the people with some degree of culpability for those injuries.
Third, mandatory insurance would inspire gun owners to exercise greater care over the use and storage of their guns. In addition to locked cabinets and separate secured storage for ammunition, insurers would demand prompt reporting of missing or stolen guns. A gun owner’s knowledge that his failure to exercise due care might negate coverage and expose him to civil liability should make him especially vigilant about his firearms. It stands to reason that, if guns become harder to steal, gun violence will drop.
Fourth, requiring insurance might result in fewer guns being sold and fewer opportunities to wreak havoc. Insurance premiums presumably would reflect the number (and caliber) of guns owned, as well as the owner’s prior gun safety record.
And fifth, a mandatory insurance program probably would make coverage unaffordable for certain high-risk individuals, such as those with criminal records, the mentally ill or histories of lax storage habits. The advantage of this approach is that the market, not government fiat, would prevent these individuals from owning guns.
Initially, insurers are likely to resist mandatory gun coverage given the lack of data with which to determine premiums. Insurance companies will overcome this problem through trial and error, making adjustments in the cost of their policies until they are able to earn a reasonable profit.
Gun liability insurance will not, in and of itself, prevent criminal or reckless behavior, but it will more accurately and equitably allocate its costs. The potential for reducing crime would be an additional salutary benefit. It also would shift the entire gun-control argument from fruitless Second Amendment debates to something more practical, something that will benefit gun owners and the public alike.
The recent killings at universities and high schools in the U.S. (yes and Canada), suggest that this is an area of public policy relating to safety and economic consequences, rather than an abstract principle that is so controversial.