The late Professor Mancur Olsen (University of Maryland and George Mason University) was well-known for applying economic concepts to explain legislative outcomes (Yale Professor William Eskridge and Berkeley Professor Phillip Frickey have also done work on this topic.
In a nutshell, Olsen believed that if one used basic supply and demand curves — it was possible to gain insight into the political process. If the benefits of a particular proposal (embodied in a draft law or bill) were concentrated and lucrative while the costs were diffuse — thus discouraging the expenditure of resources to organize in opposition to the proposal, those who favored the concept (i.e. interest groups”) would obtain that which they sought.
In contrast, if the benefits were diffuse and the costs concentrated, those who would have to bear the costs would have an incentive to organize to kill the measure.
The hybrid cases were where BOTH:
(i) the benefits and costs were diffuse, there would be no legislative action or “feel good” laws such as an appropriation for building a statute to a well-known poet or to have a particular month declared national “exercise” month; and
(ii) the benefits and costs were concentrated, then the legislature would adopt “framework legislation” in which some ideas acceptable to both sides might be adopted, but in general the legislature would delegate to an administrative agency the task of resolving the conflict. With respect to a particular matter, those who would receive greater benefits or have to bear higher costs would prevail, provided the cost of organizing a coalition were not prohibitively expensive.
There are a multitude of explanations for the present economic situation. That being said, there is general agreement that a large part of the problem was the absence of an appropriate system for regulating particular activities (e.g. the buying and selling of derivatives or securitization of mortgages) or that there were an insufficient number of trained and motivated regulators with sufficient resources and political support to fulfill the purposes for which they were hired.
How else can one explain that AIG (an insurance company) essentially had a division that operated as a hedge fund? How is it possible that whistleblowers suspicious of Messrs. Madoff’s or Stanford’s activities were ignored? Perhaps the whistleblowers were not sufficiently persistent, but it may have been a shortage or resources or a “dissent channel” if ones’ hire-ups are ignoring red flags.
Essentially, the political system is broken and there is little consensus or desire to fix it. Ever wonder why if increasing the number of IRS auditors results in larger amounts for the treasury than the cost of hiring such individuals, there are not more IRS auditors hired? Why do Congresspersons represent districts the population of which may vary significantly?
If politicians actually wanted a large share of the population to vote, why not spread voting over the course of a week, make it easier to obtain absentee ballots or make election day a federal holiday?
The absence of rules in many areas is not accidental. The reason that a small portion of the population benefit from particular laws is not mere happenstance. Those taxpayers who did not undertake to become informed and active have only themselves to blame. In many cases, people get the governments they deserve and those who see loopholes in regulatory schemes to make money generally will do so.